General bridges
WBTC is 17.6%. Remove it and 82.4% remains.
The group does not depend on one leader for a majority. 147 of 169 records had a usable reported value.See where large amounts of crypto sit, how recorded losses happened and which missing links stop us from claiming that one failure would spread.
84.4% of tracked stablecoin stock sits on three networks. Restaking is the most leader-heavy of the four infrastructure groups, but shared operators, keys, custodians and price sources are not yet joined to those numbers.
This is stock sitting on a network. It is not payment volume, trading activity or money at a reserve bank.
of tracked stablecoin stock sits on Ethereum. Remove it and the other networks still hold 51.7%.
The useful warning: trouble on Ethereum could touch a large share of stablecoins. The figure does not tell us how likely trouble is or whether one company connects every affected service.
Each line starts again at 100%. The totals must not be added because categories can overlap and answer different questions.
WBTC is 17.6%. Remove it and 82.4% remains.
The group does not depend on one leader for a majority. 147 of 169 records had a usable reported value.Arbitrum Bridge is 33.6%. Remove it and 66.4% remains.
The group does not depend on one leader for a majority. 77 of 88 records had a usable reported value.Lido is 46.3%. Remove it and 53.7% remains.
The group does not depend on one leader for a majority. 254 of 290 records had a usable reported value.EigenCloud is 64.4%. Remove it and 35.6% remains.
The leader holds more than half. 13 of 14 records had a usable reported value.EigenCloud accounts for 64.4% of reported value in Restaking. That is the strongest concentration warning here. It is not a loss forecast.
The last year contains 299 incident records. A loss amount is known for 292 of them.
known recorded loss in the one-year sample. The three largest failure types account for 64.5% of it.
7 records have no loss amount. They remain unknown, not zero. Returned-funds data appears on only 5 records, so this page does not show a recovery rate.
Those three failure types were 117 of 299 records, or 39.1% of incidents, but 64.5% of known loss. The money was more concentrated than the event count.
Choose the failed part. The page separates what is visible, what may be affected, the first move and the dependency link we still lack.
84.4% of tracked stock sits on the top three networks.
Transfers and apps on the affected network may slow or stop.
Queue instructions. Check which transfers are final before using another network.
Issuer, custodian and service links are not mapped.
General bridges report $52.6bn. Canonical bridges report $9.7bn. These totals stay separate.
New transfers, withdrawals or access to wrapped tokens may stop.
Stop new transfers. Match assets locked on one side with claims on the other.
Signers, admin keys and custodians are not joined to the reported value.
Liquid staking reports $51.4bn. Restaking reports $10.0bn. The groups may overlap.
Withdrawals, token pricing or service rewards may be affected.
Limit dependence on one service. Find who can pause it and who runs the underlying work.
Operator, price and penalty links are not mapped.
Permission and key failures account for $744.5mn of known one-year loss.
Someone may keep moving funds without approval.
Stop signing. Replace the exposed authority and check every wallet using the same path.
Current wallet, key and company ownership are not mapped.
Bad-price incidents account for $150.5mn of known one-year loss.
Loans, forced sales and account values may use a bad price.
Pause price-sensitive actions. Compare with an independent price before reopening.
The systems sharing each price source are not mapped.
The open end matters. No line on this page proves that one failure will spread through another company or system. That claim needs sourced ownership, operator, key, custodian and price-source links.
Concentration tells you where to look. These checks turn the warning into an operating answer.
Names beat org charts during an incident. One owner should be able to pause the system, explain what is final and prove the restart is safe.
Decide how much value may sit with one network, bridge, key holder or price source before a crisis chooses the limit for you.
A pause should protect money without trapping every withdrawal. The main route and the backup must be reconciled before instructions move twice.
No. It is a screening measure. Some value may be recoverable, counted elsewhere or exposed through more than one route.
No. They cover different jobs and may overlap. This page compares concentration inside each group and keeps the totals separate.
No. It shows which network holds the tokens. Reserve banks, custodians and redemption arrangements need a separate sourced map.
No. A larger share means disruption could matter more. It says nothing by itself about the chance of disruption.