What would justify
owning UNI?
A useful valuation must explain what you would own, what supports its value, and whether the price leaves enough room for disappointment.
The investment conclusion depends on the assumptions.
This is an estimate based on the dollar value of tokens burned, not cash paid to you. That starting measure also changes with UNI’s price. The estimate depends on the assumptions below and is not a forecast of the next price move.
What should you do with this estimate?
See the retail decisions. See the institutional decisions. Test a business built on Uniswap.
The token and the business are different investments.
The main estimate values one UNI token. It includes benefits that can reach UNI. A person supplying liquidity or a team building an app earns money in a different way. Their decision examples appear below.
We are assessing a three-year holding.
The ownership horizon ends on September 19, 2029. We forecast five annual periods through September 19, 2031, followed by a mature-growth period. The resulting value is a value today, rather than a price target for 2029.
A valuation asks whether the price makes sense for ownership. Technical and derivatives research helps assess entry timing and market risk. Follow the market checks after the valuation decision.
What this means: We are assessing the UNI token you could buy, not ownership of the company. We must connect the protocol’s success to that token before comparing value with price.
Where does the money go?
Traders pay to exchange assets. Liquidity providers receive their pool’s share of those fees. Eligible protocol fees support the UNI burn mechanism. Burning removes tokens; it does not put dollars into each holder’s wallet.
- Traders pay fees.They pay for a swap.
- Providers earn a share.They supply the assets.
- Eligible fees support burns.Tokens leave the supply.
| The separate observation | The amount | What it means for this model |
|---|
The measured burn value has changed over time.
The bars show each day’s recorded dollar value of burns. The line averages the latest seven days. Scaling a past period to a year does not predict the next year.
| Observation period | Dollar value of burns in the period | Yearly pace if this period repeated | How we use it |
|---|
The default uses 90 days to reduce dependence on a single recent month. That choice is an analyst assumption. A longer history spans changes in fee policy, so its lower average is not automatically a better forecast.
Where did the last 90 days of recorded burn value arise?
A large contribution is not, by itself, a problem. We show each chain so that the reader can test whether a conclusion depends on one source. Removing a chain is an adverse sensitivity, not a finding that its fees are invalid.
| Chain | Holder-directed fees | Share of the period |
|---|
Which products can support UNI?
| Product or claim | Connection to UNI | How this edition treats it |
|---|---|---|
| Uniswap v2 and v3 swaps. | Activated protocol fees can feed the burn mechanism. | The provider combines holder revenues under its v3 adapter. A v3 label does not mean the economic source was only v3. |
| Uniswap v4 swaps. | Protocol fee activation could route additional fees to UNI burns. | Official Proposal 100 was executed on July 27, 2026 for eligible pools on Ethereum, Arbitrum, Base, BNB Chain, Polygon, Optimism and Robinhood Chain. This resolves the broad activation question. The provider combines releases under v3; a zero v4 column does not prove zero contribution. We add no second amount for v4. |
| Unichain swaps and net sequencer fees. | The documented contracts send eligible net sequencer fees through a forwarding contract to the same fee collector used by the burn mechanism. | The adapter includes a Unichain Firepit. The saved 90-day series contains $14,438 for Unichain but does not split swaps from sequencer receipts. Adding a second stream would risk double counting. |
| Hooks, routing, applications and future products. | Only amounts that reach UNI’s mechanism belong to this claim. | Only benefits connected to UNI belong in its estimate. Liquidity earnings, application income and company shares have separate decision examples below. |
The provider adapter, UNI overview and UNIfication explanation explain the mechanism. The executed v4 proposal is more specific than the general overview. The Unichain contracts establish the sequencer-fee route after costs and allocations. The product-by-product data limits are recorded in the assumptions section.
What this means: Swap fees support several different participants. UNI holders benefit through the token mechanism; they do not receive all the fees users pay.
What could one UNI be worth?
Our starting story is that UNI’s fee-funded burn mechanism continues, the fee base grows for five years, and growth then slows. We discount those future economic benefits because distant and uncertain benefits are worth less today. This adapts discounted cash-flow logic to a token; it is not a claim that UNI is a share of Uniswap Labs.
The original assumptions are selected.
The model’s result is loading.
- The observed price per UNI is:
- The starting yearly benefit estimate is:
- The price is this many times our estimate:
- Moving from the price to our estimate would mean:
- The years after year five provide:
The change to estimated value is not a return forecast. The model does not specify when, or whether, market price will converge to that value.
Three assumptions produce three different answers.
The bear case reduces growth by 20 percentage points and raises the required return by 5 points. The bull case raises growth by 25 points and lowers the required return by 5 points. These are sensitivities, not probability bounds.
| Case | Growth | Required return | Value today |
|---|
Inspect the five-year forecast and the calculation.
| Forecast period | Core fees | Expected additional fees | Realized fee value | Modeled UNI supply | Present value per UNI |
|---|
The denominator begins with all unburned UNI, including treasury tokens, rather than only circulating UNI. Future issuance increases that denominator. Future burns are already represented through the economic-benefit stream, so we do not also shrink supply for those same burns. Treasury assets receive no separate value because a holder’s redeemable claim has not been established.
The terminal period assumes that the mechanism survives and mature fee growth continues indefinitely. This is a substantial assumption. The required return is an analyst-selected USD nominal rate, and all fee growth assumptions are USD nominal rates.
What price does a similar token suggest?
PancakeSwap is an initial comparison because CAKE also uses a fee-funded burn mechanism. We compare price multiplied by total unburned supply with annualized recorded burn value over the same selected period. We do not compare UNI’s token value with the enterprise value of an exchange company.
| Asset and denominator | Price × total supply | Annualized recorded burn value | Multiple |
|---|
This uses one comparison token. Different growth, new token supply, products and risks can justify different prices. CAKE also has different rules for creating tokens and sharing fees. The resulting UNI price is a comparison with CAKE, not a separate buying target.
Can a new product add value?
The executed v4 activation and recent product launches create questions worth testing. Their existence does not establish a new cash flow to UNI, a launch deadline or a separate option premium. Observed fees from any new product are already inside the baseline and must not be added again.
| What was known by the cutoff | What it could change | What must be established |
|---|---|---|
| The first v4 activation proposal was executed on July 27, 2026 for specified pools on seven chains. | Activation can expand eligible fees, some of which may already be inside the combined adapter. | The activation is recorded. Its contribution enters through the combined burn measure, so we do not add it a second time. |
| Uniswap explained StablePair Hook on September 16, 2026. | Its fee design could affect stable-pair liquidity and activity. | Better outcomes for liquidity providers must not be assumed to be incremental income for UNI. |
| UNI governance can authorize additional issuance. | New supply could dilute each existing token’s modeled economic benefits. | We need the actual minting decision and supply change, rather than assume permission has been exercised. |
Test an additional fee stream without calling it an option.
This is an explicitly hypothetical event scenario. Enter only fees absent from the baseline. The probability represents your assumption about the stream arising, rather than a measured chance of approval. The scenario adds the probability-weighted annual fees from the chosen year, keeps that amount flat through year five, and applies mature growth thereafter.
We have not added an extra amount for an option. An option is a right to make a future investment on defined terms. To value it, we need to know the asset, what exercising the right costs, when the right ends and how the owner benefits. Those inputs have not been established for an incremental UNI option. Applying Black–Scholes to UNI’s market price would price a derivative on UNI; it would not discover UNI’s intrinsic value.
What this means: The calculator shows what your assumptions imply. The peer comparison supplies another perspective. We add no option value without a specific, measurable right, and we do not average the three approaches.
What would justify the market price?
The reverse calculation changes only five-year core-fee growth. It keeps the selected fee base, issuance, required return, terminal growth and additional-fee scenario fixed. The result tells us what that particular model requires, rather than what the market collectively believes.
The answer depends on both growth and the required return.
The cells show value per UNI, with the selected assumptions used everywhere else. A high value that appears only under rapid growth and a low required return is a weaker basis for investment.
| Change to the assumptions | Value per UNI | What the test establishes |
|---|
How does this compare with other published estimates?
Other analysts have published UNI estimates. Different assumptions explain different answers; a nearby estimate is not proof of accuracy.
| Published research | Its estimate | Why the difference needs explanation |
|---|---|---|
| SEBA Bank, March 2021, page 10. | Its equally weighted UNI estimate was $55.06. Its base case was $18.78 before a 2× governance multiplier, giving $37.56. | It used an earlier forecast, circulating supply and scenario-specific governance multipliers. Charlie uses September 2026 observations, total unburned supply and no governance multiplier. These are not estimates of identical economics at the same date. |
| The Mispriced Research, September 2, 2026. | Its UNI base scenario was $5.00–$6.75, against its $5.88 quote. | It discussed gross fees, TVL and hypothetical token-capture rates. The public article does not disclose enough of its calculation to independently reproduce that range. Charlie’s published $1.13 proxy is approximately 77%–83% below it, but this is not a like-for-like accuracy score. |
To compare these estimates fairly, first use the same date, token rights, income measure, supply and future assumptions. Similar answers from different calculations would not prove either one right.
What this means: More growth raises the estimate. More risk or more tokens lowers it. Under the published assumptions, the market price needs a stronger benefit stream.
What does this mean for you?
Buying UNI, making a swap and building a business are different decisions. Start with the activity you are considering.
For direct UNI ownership, retail and institutional investors start with the same estimate. Institutions can also provide liquidity, execute trades, build services or invest in the company. Those activities require their own income and cost comparison.
The calculator below assesses a new purchase. If you already own UNI, compare future benefits with future ownership and selling costs; do not charge yourself for a purchase fee you have already paid.
The conclusion applies to the selected assumptions. A percentage gap measures price versus estimated value; it does not predict a price fall or a date when the market will agree.
What would change this valuation conclusion?
Translate the fund’s dollar position into UNI exposure.
A position can fit a fund’s loss limit and still be too expensive. Compare its value with its price before checking the fund’s trading costs, custody arrangements and investment rules.
Retail: choose what you want to do.
- Buy or keep UNI.
For an existing holding, compare the future benefit with what you could do with the money elsewhere. The original buying price does not make the token worth more today. Selling costs and taxes can affect your personal choice.
- Swap one asset for another.
Choose the route that delivers more of the asset you want after costs, with acceptable execution risk. You do not need UNI ownership to make every Uniswap swap.
Worked example. These are assumed quotes, not offers.
The same trade leaves you with $990 of the desired asset on Uniswap and $985 elsewhere, after all costs. Uniswap wins this comparison by $5. Compare the same asset, size and timestamp before choosing.
- Earn fees by supplying liquidity.
Worked example. These are assumed end-of-year values.
Simply holding your starting assets ends at $10,500. Your pool assets end at $10,100 before fees. Add $600 in fees and subtract $100 in costs: you finish with $10,600. The pool position beats holding by $100, or 1% of the $10,000 starting amount. A further $100 of costs or inventory loss removes that advantage.
The decision is to proceed only if the expected extra return is worth the extra risk. A high fee rate alone does not establish that.
Institutions: choose the investment or business activity.
The token figures below use the published case. Other numerical examples are labeled assumptions; they are not observed deal returns.
- Own UNI through a fund or treasury.
The published $1.13 estimate is 88.0% below $9.35. Do not add for the modeled token benefits at this price. A $1 million holding would represent about 106,952 UNI before costs. A 70% fall would lose $700,000, or 0.7% of a $100 million fund. Passing that loss limit does not justify the purchase price.
The fund’s example uses a 35% buying cushion and a 2% cost allowance. Its maximum buying price under the published assumptions is $0.72. This is a valuation condition, not an entry order.
- Supply liquidity at scale.
Use the same comparison as the retail pool example: the value of the pool assets plus fees, less costs, against simply holding the assets. Proceed only when the extra expected return pays for the extra inventory, contract and exit risks. Scaling the $10,000 example to $1 million would give $10,000 extra only if the same fee share and costs scaled proportionally. Actual liquidity and market impact can break that assumption.
- Execute trades or make markets for clients.
Worked example. The fee and costs are assumed.
A 0.10% service charge on a $1 million customer trade earns $1,000. If execution, hedging and allocated operating costs total $700, the service earns $300 before tax. Proceed for this case if the execution also meets the client’s price and risk requirements. Reject the trade on profit grounds when those costs reach or exceed $1,000.
- Build an app, pool product or protocol on Uniswap.
A wallet, trading app or pool tool can earn its own income without owning UNI. Build when the present value of the business’s net income exceeds its build cost by enough to justify the risk. Use the editable business example below to find that limit. Count only revenue the business can actually retain; total Uniswap fees are not the builder’s revenue.
- Invest in Uniswap Labs shares.
UNI does not give ownership of Uniswap Labs. Compare the offered shares with the value of the company’s future cash flows and the rights attached to those shares.
Worked example for a company. This is not a valuation of Uniswap Labs.
Operations worth $100 million, plus $20 million cash and minus $10 million debt, leave $110 million for shareholders. With 10 million equal shares, the estimate is $11 per share. An offer at $12 is 9.1% above that estimate, so those assumed economics do not justify it before costs. Real preferred-share terms can change this calculation.
- Acquire UNI for a specific governance objective.
100,000 UNI costs $935,000 at the saved price. The published token model assigns those tokens about $112,582. The strategic benefit must cover at least the $822,418 difference before additional costs if this model is the buyer’s starting value. A lower-cost delegation or another way to achieve the objective changes the comparison.
This is a minimum value hurdle, not a claim that 100,000 votes can pass a proposal. Do not count benefits already inside the UNI estimate a second time.
Have institutions already invested or used Uniswap?
Yes. Public records show token-fund holdings, company financing and use of Uniswap’s trading infrastructure. These are different forms of involvement.
| Public example | What was disclosed | What it tells an investor |
|---|---|---|
| Grayscale DeFi Fund, July 31, 2026. | UNI represented 39.49% of the fund’s composition. | A fund held UNI exposure. The weight is not its purchase price, a new inflow or proof that UNI is cheap. |
| Bitwise Uniswap Fund. | The fund’s stated strategy invests directly in UNI. It launched in 2021. | This gives investors a token-fund route. Its published fund value is not the entry price paid for each token. |
| BlackRock, Securitize and Uniswap, February 11, 2026. | The joint release described a strategic investment within the Uniswap ecosystem and access to BUIDL swaps through UniswapX. It named Flowdesk, Tokka Labs and Wintermute as quoting participants. | This supports a real institutional execution use. The primary release did not identify the investment instrument, amount or price. It cannot establish a UNI purchase price. |
| Talos, August 21, 2025. | Talos confirmed that Uniswap v2, v3 and v4 were integrated into its platform. | An institution can use Uniswap as trading infrastructure. Integration alone does not disclose client profit or extra income reaching UNI. |
| Uniswap Labs, October 13, 2022. | Labs announced a $165 million funding round led by Polychain, with existing investors participating. | This was company financing. The money must not be counted as $165 million of UNI purchases. |
Do we know an actual institutional execution price?
A July 14, 2021 statement from DeFi Education Fund reported that Genesis executed its 500,000 UNI sale on July 12 at an average $20.40. Genesis used its own inventory before settlement with the fund. This is a disclosed historical sale execution, not proof of a long-term investment bought at $20.40. It gives no floor under today’s value.
The token-fund records above establish exposure, but they do not disclose a current transaction-level buying price. We do not substitute a fund’s accounting value or a dated market quote for that price.
What this means: Institutional involvement is real. Its effect on UNI value depends on the benefits that actually reach the token; a well-known participant’s name is not an extra valuation amount.
Would a business built on Uniswap pay for itself?
A team could build a wallet feature, trading interface, hook or other service. The customer pays that business only where its product and fee terms allow it. The test below values three years of that business’s income.
Editable worked example. All four inputs are assumptions, not Uniswap’s accounts or a forecast for an existing business.
Value earned versus money committed.
The future income is reduced to its value today.
Show the business calculation.
| Year after launch | Income after running costs | That income’s value today |
|---|
The example assumes the same income each year, received at year-end, with no resale value after year three. Running costs must include the business’s expected taxes, losses, maintenance and required reinvestment; the illustration supplies no separate tax calculation. The build cost is paid today. Risk can be tested by lowering retained revenue or increasing costs.
What this means: A useful business can justify its build cost even when UNI is too expensive under the token model. The two estimates belong to different owners.
The review has a timetable.
| When we review it | What we examine | What follows from the evidence |
|---|---|---|
| October 19, 2026 is the first planned review. | Reconcile another month of fees to collections, burns, issuance and each chain’s contribution. | Replace assumptions with observed facts where possible. Investigate a 30-day holder-fee run rate more than 25% below the selected baseline. |
| December 19, 2026 is the first quarterly review. | Test realized growth, market share, fee rates and the case for additional products. | Re-estimate the five-year path. These dates are analytical checkpoints, not scheduled automations or promised catalyst dates. |
| Any material governance or security event triggers an earlier review. | Check fee redirection, new issuance, interrupted collection or a loss of access to the mechanism. | Rebuild the affected assumptions before relying on the previous conclusion. |
| September 19, 2029 ends the selected ownership horizon. | Compare the original expectations with the actual economics and investment outcome. | Assess the original thesis and make a new forward-looking ownership decision. |
What this means: Both investors need evidence that the price is justified. A personal investor checks affordability and possible loss. An institution identifies its activity first, then compares that activity’s expected benefit with its own costs and risks.
From valuation to an investment decision.
At the published assumptions, wait on a new UNI purchase for long-term ownership. A stronger price chart alone would not close the valuation gap.
The linked numbers tell two different stories.
UNI’s price rose with faster trading on Binance: average daily trading over the latest seven complete days was 1.44 times the prior 21-day average. Futures positions also grew. Those observations support an active rally, while the published valuation still does not justify the saved price.
Uniswap v3 and v4 together processed $19.99 billion in the latest complete week, down from $20.94 billion. That measures swaps across many tokens on Uniswap, not trading in UNI itself. A rally in the token and a slowdown in the venues can happen together.
Price and trading windows end September 18, 2026. The futures comparison uses September 12 and 19 at 00:00 UTC. The pool comparison uses September 12–18 versus September 5–11. Binance prices are in USDT; the frozen valuation quote is in USD. The linked sections show the source, the chart and the conditions that would change each conclusion.
- Does the price fit the value?
The published case does not justify $9.35. A lower price or a stronger quantified benefit estimate must change that first.
- Does market behavior support an entry?
Then check the trend, trading participation, futures crowding and borrowing costs for UNI at the intended time. These signals inform timing and risk; they do not add dollars to the valuation.
- Can the position be entered and exited?
Check executable quotes for the actual size, custody and the loss limit. For a pool or business, check its own income and costs instead of requiring a cheap UNI token.
| Open this Charlie page | What to use it for | Coverage checked for this edition |
|---|---|---|
| Market Agreement Engine | Compare trend, participation and positioning. | A dedicated UNI section uses completed Binance daily prices through September 18. It also records a separate intraday quote. |
| Futures Pressure Board | Understand funding costs and crowded positions. | A dedicated UNI section compares dated open positions, settled funding and account positioning on Binance. |
| DEX Monitor | Check Uniswap trading activity and competing venues. | Includes a dedicated v3 and v4 comparison for completed weeks. Gross pool trading is not your profit or a UNI-token entry signal. |
| On-Chain Economic Map | Compare network use, fees and activity. | Chain-level context, not a UNI-holder cash-flow forecast. |
| Institutional Exit Capacity | Understand the difference between trading volume and available orders. | Its selected coins do not include UNI. Obtain UNI quotes before using it for a UNI position. |
These pages have their own observation dates and may update. Their figures do not automatically alter this September 19 valuation. The dedicated UNI sections connect this valuation with observed market conditions. They do not promise a profitable entry or combine all the checks into an automatic trading instruction.
What this means: The published token assumptions say to wait on adding for the modeled benefits. A future purchase needs both a price that fits the revised value and a separate entry and risk assessment.
Assumptions, calculations and data limits.
This section records exactly what the estimate includes, what is assumed and what still needs work. The research follows scope, trace, infer, validate and report; the headings above are written around the reader’s questions.
How is the starting burn measure recorded?
Swap fees are divided between liquidity providers and the protocol according to each deployment’s rules. Protocol fees can then enter the UNI burn mechanism. DefiLlama’s “holders revenue” series estimates UNI burned from Firepit release events multiplied by a burn threshold, then values those tokens in dollars. It is a release-based burn-value proxy, rather than same-day fee-asset receipts or a cash dividend. Release timing, the threshold and UNI’s price affect the observation.
In the valuation controls, “fee base” is shorthand for this burn-value proxy. Growth means growth in the proxy’s USD value, which can reflect token pricing and release cadence as well as operating performance. Raw fee receipts must be reconciled before interpreting it as business-revenue growth.
What is complete, and which evidence is still missing?
What is complete, assumed and incomplete?
| Part of the work | Status | What the reader can conclude |
|---|---|---|
| Dated prices, supply observations and complete daily windows. | Complete for the saved API records. | The September 19 quotes and the selected periods can be reproduced. This does not mean the provider’s supply figure has been independently reconciled onchain. |
| The calculation, price gap, scenarios and ownership thresholds. | Complete under the stated assumptions. | The estimate and the conclusion follow from these inputs. Independent reviews reproduce the calculation. |
| Growth, required return, future issuance and the share of benefits retained. | Explicit assumptions. | These are inputs to the estimate, not observed future results. Readers can change them and see the decision change. |
| Receipts, unreleased balances and burns matched across chains. | Incomplete. | The dollar burn measure is not a complete account of money earned in the same period. Timing and UNI’s price can move the observation. |
| Separate product contributions, supply ledger, future costs and reinvestment. | Incomplete. | The page cannot establish every benefit and cost of UNI ownership. Missing amounts could raise or lower the estimate. |
| Profitability of individual liquidity positions, integrations, execution services or company equity. | Not calculated in this edition. | The institutional examples explain the decision arithmetic using labeled assumptions. They do not measure an existing participant’s profit. |
The inference is complete for the assumed case: the published estimate does not justify the recorded UNI price. The incomplete items limit how much of UNI’s total economic value the estimate captures; they do not erase the calculated price gap.
We checked the gaps again and recorded how they could mislead us.
A false positive means calling UNI attractive when it is not. A false negative means rejecting UNI when its real economics would justify the price. Missing evidence can cause either error; it is not proof of zero value.
| Question | What the additional check established | How a mistake could change value |
|---|---|---|
| Were v4 fees actually activated? | Yes, the first proposal was executed on July 27 for specified pools on seven chains. It does not establish activation of every v4 pool on every chain. | Ignoring existing receipts could make value too low. Adding a separate v4 amount already included in the collector could make value too high. |
| Does Unichain have a route to UNI’s mechanism? | Yes. Official contracts show fee splitting followed by forwarding to the fee collector. Optimism receives the higher of 15% of net fees or 2.5% of gross fees. The amount left for this route still needs a dated reconciliation. | Using gross chain revenue would overstate the benefit. Omitting net fees that have accrued but have not reached a release could understate it. |
| Does released burn value equal money earned during the same period? | That has not been established. We need the fee assets received, their dollar values, amounts awaiting release, historical burn thresholds and release records. | Clearing an old backlog could make the current earning pace look too high. Unreleased receipts could make it look too low. UNI price changes can also move the dollar measure without equivalent business growth. |
| Is the supply denominator complete and current? | We have a dated CoinGecko total-supply observation and the governance minting rules. We do not yet have an independent cutoff ledger of minting, burns and cross-chain balances. | Too few tokens in the denominator makes value per token too high. Too many makes it too low. New issuance reduces each existing token’s share. |
| Can the business sustain the assumed benefits? | The forecast does not separately reconcile future incentives, costs or reinvestment. We show lower realization, weaker growth and higher required returns as tests. | Ignoring necessary spending or failure risk can overstate value. Assuming every cost reduces holder benefits when another funded source pays it can understate value. |
These effects are possibilities, not measured error probabilities. Under the original assumptions, each additional $1 million of sustainable yearly starting benefit adds about $0.0109 per UNI. Matching $9.35 by changing only that starting benefit would require about $857.8 million a year, compared with the observed $103.3 million annualized proxy. We have not found evidence establishing that missing amount.
The decision: The modeled benefits do not justify the recorded price. Use that as the valuation conclusion for this case, and keep the named missing amounts visible when deciding whether a different case is justified. The remaining work is named in the calculation and data notes; the model does not silently turn unknowns into facts.
Read the full equations, evidence checks and reproducible method.
Ask Charlie about this valuation.
Ask in your own words, including follow-up questions. The research assistant uses this September 19 edition and its published assumptions. It can explain unfamiliar terms and interpret imperfect wording. It does not fetch a newer price or automatically read your changed model inputs.
Answers refer to the frozen research. If the evidence does not establish an answer, Charlie should say so. Generated explanations can still make mistakes; the numerical model, methodology and sources remain inspectable.
Sources and review notes.
Charlie Quant Lab considers intrinsic valuation, relative pricing and genuine option rights separately. The page does not average different methods into a single claim of true value.
CoinGecko supplies the saved price and supply observations. DefiLlama supplies the fee and burn records. Primary documents explain the token rights and product rules. Technical details are available in the downloadable method.
| Source | Role in this analysis |
|---|
Download the dated evidence. Read the assumptions, calculations and missing data. Read the independent review.
This revision has passed two fresh independent AI peer reviews. They checked the calculations, source evidence, decision examples and connected UNI sections, starting without the author’s conversation or each other’s conclusions. The reports record the findings and corrections. This is research review, not professional certification or a guarantee of future returns.